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Non-technical summary
The credibility crisis regarding the sustainability of public debt has transformed the mar-
kets for government bonds in the Euro area. A new sensitivity of creditors for the risk
of sovereign default has pushed up financing costs of several euro member countries or
has even cut them off from market access. Currently, policy makers try to enhance their
fiscal reputation through the establishment of better European and national fiscal rules,
particular in form of the debt brakes prescribed by the European Fiscal Compact. The
hope is that, independent from the current budgetary performance, new fiscal rules send
out credible signals to the markets and cut short the way towards lowering the risk spread.
In our paper we study the determinants of sovereign risk premia in the EU countries
between 1992 and 2008. Our contribution addresses two interrelated questions: First, do
fiscal rules impact on sovereign risk premia in Europe? And second, is any such observable
link really causal or rather the consequence of different national “stability cultures”, which
arise from differing historical institutions or fiscal preferences?
In our empirical analysis, we try to shed light on this issue by employing several
types of stability preference related proxies. These proxies are related to a country’s past
stability performance, government characteristics and survey results related to general
trust. We find evidence that these indicators have an influence on risk premia. Moreover,
they dampen the measurable impact of fiscal rules on risk premia. The estimated positive
effect of fiscal rules on market confidence in the early years of EMU can thus mainly be
explained by the fact that mainly high-stability countries introduced such constraints. Our
results indicate that these stability-oriented countries would not have had a significantly
lower financial market reputation if they had not established fiscal rules. Thus, for these
countries strict fiscal rules may be rather interpreted as a confirmation of the underlying
fiscal preferences of the voters and their political representatives. Still, even if this is true,
it does not preclude the possibility that the new establishment of strict rules – such as
intended by the Fiscal Compact – is relevant for fiscal reputation in countries with a lack
of historical stability orientation. Our results rather point to the fact that fiscal rules have
the largest potential for countries with particularly poor stability culture in the past: for
these countries, the effect of rules on risk premia is significantly stronger than for high-
stability countries. It seems that these countries could benefit from the establishment of
debt brakes which is intended by the Fiscal Compact.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Vertrauenskrise hinsichtlich der Tragbarkeit der o¨ffentlichen Verschuldung hat die
Ma¨rkte fu¨r Staatsanleihen des Euroraums nachhaltig vera¨ndert. Eine neue Sensitivita¨t der
Investoren fu¨r das Risiko von staatlichen Zahlungsausfa¨llen hat die Finanzierungskosten
zahlreicher Euro-Mitgliedstaaten in die Ho¨he getrieben oder sogar deren Marktzugang
abgeschnitten. Eine von der Politik derzeit verfolgte Strategie besteht in dem Bestreben,
das Vertrauen in die Fiskalpolitik mittels der Einrichtung von verbesserten europa¨ischen
oder nationalen Fiskalregeln, insbesondere in der Form der vom Fiskalpakt vorgeschriebe-
nen Schuldenbremsen, zu erho¨hen. Damit wird auch die Hoffnung verbunden, dass diese
Fiskalregeln, unabha¨ngig von der derzeitigen Haushaltslage, glaubwu¨rdige Signale an die
Ma¨rkte aussenden und so mit dazu beitragen ko¨nnen, kurzfristig die Risikoaufschla¨ge zu
verringern.
In diesem Papier untersuchen wir die Determinanten der Risikopra¨mien der Staats-
anleihen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten zwischen 1992 und 2008. Unser Beitrag wendet sich
zwei miteinander verbundenen Fragestellungen zu: Erstens, beeinflussen Fiskalregeln die
Ho¨he von Risikopra¨mien auf europa¨ische Staatsanleihen? Und zweitens, ist ein derar-
tiger beobachtbarer Zusammenhang tatsa¨chlich kausal oder aber die Konsequenz von sich
zwischen den Staaten unterscheidenden “Stabilita¨tskulturen”, die das Ergebnis unter-
schiedlicher historischer Entwicklungen oder fiskalischer Pra¨ferenzen sind?
In unserer empirischen Analyse versuchen wir diese Fragen durch die Verwendung
verschiedener Arten von Proxyvariablen fu¨r die Stabilita¨tspra¨ferenzen zu kla¨ren. Diese
Proxyvariablen beziehen sich auf die historische Stabilita¨tsperformanz eines Staates, Re-
gierungscharakteristika sowie Umfrageergebnisse zum generellen interpersonellen Vertrau-
en. Es zeigt sich, dass diese Indikatoren die Ho¨he der Risikopra¨mien beeinflussen. Zudem
da¨mpfen sie den messbaren Einfluss von Fiskalregeln auf Risikopra¨mien. Der beobacht-
bare positive Effekt von Fiskalregeln auf das Vertrauen der Ma¨rkte in den ersten Jahren
der Wa¨hrungsunion la¨sst sich somit vor allem dadurch erkla¨ren, dass u¨berwiegend ohne-
hin stabilita¨tsorientierte La¨nder solche Beschra¨nkungen eingefu¨hrt haben. Unsere Ergeb-
nisse deuten darauf hin, dass diese stabilita¨tsorientierten La¨nder nicht u¨ber ein bedeu-
tend geringeres Vertrauen der Finanzma¨rkte verfu¨gt ha¨tten, falls sie keine Fiskalregeln
eingefu¨hrt ha¨tten. Somit lassen sich die strengen Fiskalregeln in diesen La¨ndern eher
als ein weiterer Ausdruck der ohnehin vorhandenen fiskalischen Pra¨ferenzen der Wa¨hler
und ihrer politischen Vertreter ansehen. Jedoch schließt dieses nicht die Mo¨glichkeit
aus, dass die Neueinfu¨hrung von strengen Regeln, wie sie etwa durch den Fiskalpakt
beabsichtigt wird, bedeutsam fu¨r das Marktvertrauen gegenu¨ber La¨ndern mit einer his-
torisch geringen Stabilita¨tsorientierung ist. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten sogar darauf hin,
dass Fiskalregeln das gro¨ßte Potenzial fu¨r La¨nder mit einer in der Vergangenheit beson-
ders schwach ausgepra¨gten Stabilita¨tskultur aufweisen: Fu¨r diese La¨nder ist der von
Fiskalregeln ausgehende Effekt auf die Ho¨he der Risikoaufschla¨ge signifikant sta¨rker als fu¨r
eher stabilita¨tsorientierte Staaten. Es scheint, dass solche Staaten von der im Fiskalpakt
vorgesehenen Einfu¨hrung von Schuldenbremsen in besonderem Maße profitieren ko¨nnten.
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1 Introduction
The credibility crisis regarding the sustainability of public debt has transformed the mar-
kets for government bonds in the Euro area. A new sensitivity of creditors for the risk of
sovereign default has pushed up financing costs of several euro member countries or has
even cut them off from market access. This fundamental change in risk awareness has
multiplied the interest rate costs associated with a deteriorating fiscal position.
Politics have reacted in various ways ranging from drastic consolidation efforts over
European emergency credit lines to the search for a framework for orderly defaults. Apart
from these approaches, one strategy is to foster fiscal reputation through better European
and national fiscal rules. In this context, important actors like the Commission’s president
José Manuel Barroso or the German chancellor Angela Merkel have called for a “new
stability culture” in Europe,1 which is supposed to reassure the bond markets about the
new reliability of consolidation strategies and a brighter fiscal future.
A crucial question in this context is, of course, to which extent ‘stability culture’
can swiftly be changed by politicians or legislators. The answer depends on the precise
definition since this term has at least two connotations. First, it can be related to the
rules which constrain a country’s fiscal policy. Second, it may point to long run fiscal
preferences of citizens and/or politicians as well as national institutional characteristics,
which are a heritage of a country’s history. Both dimensions are fundamentally distinct.
Whereas preferences can hardly be changed through short-run political measures, fiscal
rules are open for such adjustments.
Currently, policy makers try to foster fiscal reputation through the establishment of
better European and national fiscal rules. In particular, the Fiscal Compact which was
agreed by the European Heads of State of Government in December 2011 prescribes that
all participating countries (all EU member states without the United Kingdom and the
Czech Republic) will have to introduce national fiscal rules by the end of 2013 (European
Central Bank, 2012). These rules have to be introduced in the national legislation, prefer-
ably in the form of constitutional provisions, and they have to fulfill certain requirements,
in particular they have to limit the structural deficit of the general government at 0.5% of
1Barroso: “Our priority is putting order into our public finances. We need fiscal consolidation and
a new financial stability culture in Europe.” (Introductory remarks at a joint press point with the
German Chancellor Angela Merkel, June 11, 2011); Merkel proposed a “new stability culture” in Europe
to overcome the turmoil that has battered the euro on the foreign exchange markets (AFP, May 19, 2010).
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GDP. The hope is that, independent from the current budgetary performance, such fiscal
rules send out credible signals and cut short the way towards lowering the risk spread.
Indeed, there is some empirical evidence in the context of US states, EU countries or Swiss
cantons that properly designed fiscal rules can actually reduce risk spreads (see survey
below). The available empirical evidence, however, is limited to the rules-dimension of
stability culture so that all conclusions are necessarily preliminary.
The essential problem is that these rules may reflect stability oriented preferences of a
country’s voters and politicians and, thus, the effect of fiscal rules on risk premia can be a
result of a common-cause-interdependence: Conservative fiscal preferences might have led
both to the establishment of rules and to lower risk premia. This criticism is well known
from the literature on the effectiveness of fiscal rules (Poterba, 1996): A correlation of
strict fiscal rules and low public deficits cannot necessarily be interpreted causally. Voters
who dislike public debt will also favour strict debt limits. If this is the case, the observed
fiscal link between rules and fiscal policy outcomes could be spurious. This methodological
problem is of immediate policy relevance. A new rule as such does not change preferences,
in particular if it is established as a consequence of external pressure. If the markets rather
pay attention to preferences than to written rules, they could remain sceptical vis-à-vis a
high debt country. Rules which seem to work in one country might then fail in another.
Hence, we have to address different empirical questions: First, is the establishment of
fiscal rules largely driven by stability-oriented preferences? Second, does the impact of
fiscal rules on risk premia survive if fiscal preferences are taken into account through
appropriate proxies? And third, could fiscal rules have a different impact in countries
with high and low stability preferences?
Thus, it is the key objective of our contribution to integrate the stability culture
dimension into the study of risk premium determinants in Europe and to address the
questions above. Specifically, we want to understand how both dimensions of stability
culture – rules and preferences – influence government bond risk premia and how they
interact.
The paper is structured as follows: In a first step, we give a brief overview of the
relevant literature including the few studies explicitly devoted to the issue of stability
culture and fiscal performance. In the empirical section, we first check the robustness
of the (one-dimensional) link between rules and risk premia in Europe. Afterwards, we
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include different proxies for a country’s stability culture to shed light on the impact of
these proxies and their interaction with the effect of fiscal rules on risk premia.
2 The relevant literature
2.1 Effects of fiscal rules
The studies on the effectiveness of fiscal rules are one important point of reference. Fiscal
rules are shown to be an effective obstacle to a build-up of public debt. This strengthens
the expectation that they also might influence the expectations of investors and, con-
sequently, the level of risk premia. The literature on fiscal rules’ effectiveness has been
inspired by the establishment of tax and expenditure limits in US federal states since
the end of the 1970s and the Maastricht fiscal rules in Europe in the 1990s. The effec-
tiveness of two different types of rules has been studied: first, rules for the budgetary
processes (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999; von Hagen and Harden, 1995), and second,
numerical fiscal rules. The impact of numerical fiscal rules has been looked at in several
regional contexts: for the US (e.g. Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1994; Poterba, 1996), for
Europe (e.g. Debrun, 2000; Debrun et al., 2008), for OECD countries (e.g. Dahan and
Strawczynski, 2010) and for Swiss cantons and municipalities (e.g. Feld and Kirchgässner,
2008; Krogstrup and Wälti, 2008). Overall, this literature is moderately optimistic that
strict rules can be effective; however, some of the studies point to circumventing activities
through creative accounting (von Hagen and Wolff, 2006).
If such a link between rules and fiscal policy outcomes is anticipated by financial
markets, the reaction of a rational investor is unambiguous: He should assess the sustain-
ability of a country’s fiscal stance more positive if it has a fiscal rule in place and demand
a lower compensation for the default risk of the sovereign bond than for a comparable
country without any fiscal rules in place. This should contribute to a lower level of risk
premia for countries with stricter fiscal rules.2
Yet, empirical studies dealing with such a direct impact of fiscal rules on risk premia
are less frequent.3 For the US, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) find a significant impact
2A theoretical discussion of the link between fiscal rules and risk premia in a model of sovereign default
and its implications for optimal target values for fiscal rules can be found in Hatchondo et al. (2012).
3Note that this literature does not consider a possible (long-term) indirect effect of fiscal rules: rules
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of strong rules on US states’ borrowing conditions. Poterba and Rueben (1999) arrive
at a more differentiated view: Whereas strong deficit and expenditure lower yields, tax
limits make a state more risky from the investors’ perspective and increase yields. Poterba
and Rueben (2001) focus on the interaction between deficits and rules. A sudden deficit
increase lifts a state’s financing costs, but the size of the rise is limited if the state has a
strict rule. This result points to a credibility effect even in times of fiscal stress. Lowry
and Alt (2001) modify the result and show that repeated deficits erode the credibility
effect of strict rules at bond markets. All these works, however, suffer from the fact that
they do not consider actual financial market data but are based on data from the ‘Chubb
Relative Value Survey’. This survey is conducted by an insurance company which asked
25 traders to evaluate ‘hypothetical’ general obligations of US states. Johnson and Kriz
(2005) emphasise the disadvantages of this data, which seems to bias the estimated effects
upwards: By using financial market data, they only find a very modest effect of fiscal rules
on bond spreads (between 2.4 and 3.3 basis points).
For Europe, Hallerberg and Wolff (2008) make use of an index measuring the insti-
tutional strength of the finance minister and, thus, build on the insights on budgetary
procedures. They find that deficits generally drive risk premia, but this link is weaker
with strong institutions. Iara and Wolff (2011) focus on numerical fiscal rules and study
their impact on risk premia for the initial eleven Euro area countries for the years 1999
to 2009 in a panel estimation. The authors make use of the European Commission’s
Fiscal Rule Index (FRI) (European Commission, 2006). Using a standard fixed effects
estimation approach (which is comparable to most of the literature, including our baseline
model), they do not find an overall significant effect of fiscal rules on risk spreads, but
they do find a significant impact if they interact the FRI with the general risk aversion
of the market. Thus, fiscal rules only have a negative effect on bond spreads in a market
environment where risk sensitivity is high. Finally, Feld et al. (2012) find a robust neg-
ative effect of fiscal rules on bond spreads for Swiss cantons; this effect is quantitatively
relatively strong (more than 10 basis points for strong rules). Compared to US state
rules or national rules, this strong effect seems reasonable given the relatively stringent
design of fiscal rules in Switzerland. They are, for instance, often associated with strong
enforcement mechanisms in the form of automatic tax adjustments after non-compliance
with the numerical targets of the rules.
can also improve the country’s budgetary position, which is then reflected in lower bond spreads.
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2.2 Stability culture and fiscal preferences
So far, none of the existing studies on the link between fiscal rules and risk premia explic-
itly integrate fiscal preference proxies. In this regard, the paper most closely related to
ours is the work by Bernoth and Wolff (2008), who find that signals of creative accounting
increase bond spreads in European countries. Even though the paper is not explicit about
this, one might easily argue that fiscal transparency is a dimension strongly related to a
country’s stability culture.
Generally, there are only few approaches which explicitly take account of fiscal prefer-
ences for the empirical explanation of fiscal outcomes and they focus either on politicians’
or citizens’ preferences. With respect to political preferences, a common approach in
the literature is to equate fiscal conservatism with general political conservatism. With
this approach, a government’s party affiliation is used as an indicator of fiscal preferences
(Holtz-Eakin, 1988; Poterba, 1995). Bohn and Inman (1996) make use of a CBS/New
York Times opinion poll with respect to a self-assessment as ‘conservative’ (for the period
1976-1988). It is an obvious shortcoming of any such approach that political ideology –
simply defined as left-wing or right-wing – is not necessarily representative for the eco-
nomic policy preferences of parties and, hence, not equal to fiscal conservatism in the
sense of an aversion against public debt. A more explicit approach is only applied by
Pujol (2009), who tries to distil an indicator of fiscal attitude concerning deficits and debt
for the US presidents from a quantitative analysis of key documents with respect to the
frequency of certain words and arguments. The evidence demonstrates that preferences
cannot simply be reduced to a simple deterministic product of economic conditions and
a President’s party affiliation.
Stix (2011) directly measures the fiscal preferences of citizens using a self-conducted
Austrian survey which includes focussed questions on public debt preferences. He shows
that individual preferences are clearly related to self-interest but also to perceptions of dis-
tributional fairness among the current generation and the credibility of the government’s
fiscal plans. Heinemann and Hennighausen (2012) exploit survey results from Germany.
The relevant survey question focuses on the trade-off between reducing public borrowing
and increasing taxes or reducing benefits. Their results imply that one main driver of
individual preferences for higher public debt are self-interest motives predicted by Ricar-
dian reasoning. Moreover, interpersonal trust contributes positively to the willingness to
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consolidate, whereas party preferences do not exercise a strong influence. Survey ques-
tions like the ones developed by Stix or Heinemann and Hennighausen would be ideal for
our analysis if they were available on a cross-country basis. Unfortunately, they are not.
Dafflon and Pujol (2001) exploit the preferences revealed by Swiss voters in fiscal
referenda. A voting behaviour is classified as conservative if it supports tax increases,
expenditure cuts or deficit and expenditure limits. Their indicator of fiscal preferences
helps to explain Swiss cantonal deficits in the context of a standard explanatory model.
Pujol and Weber (2003) build on the cantonal indicator from Dafflon and Pujol (2001)
and check to which extent these fiscal preferences can be treated as exogenous in empirical
exercises. For that purpose, they estimate a model for explaining fiscal preferences. It
turns out that party preferences and religious denomination are important, but language
has the heaviest impact on these preferences. In particular, the German speaking share of
the cantonal population is strongly related to favouring fiscal conservatism. Equally, Funk
and Gathmann (2011) employ an indicator for time-varying fiscal preferences based on
voting behaviour in federal ballots. The inclusion of this fiscal preference indicator does
not significantly affect the result according to which (Swiss) direct democracy reduces
spending. Hence, the evidence implies that citizens’ fiscal preferences are – at least in
the short-run – exogenous, although the measurement is challenging. This gives strong
support to the expectation that the fiscal preferences of citizens have to be regarded as
rather stable over time and that they are deeply rooted in the culture and history of a
country, meaning its stability culture. The Funk and Gathmann measure is applied by
Krogstrup and Wälti (2008) who show that the impact of fiscal rules on cantonal deficits
is still detectable even if there is a control for fiscal preferences.
Concerning the interplay of stability culture and institutions, some findings from the
monetary policy literature are relevant to our approach. In particular, Hayo (1998) looks
for the link of anti-inflation culture, central bank independence and inflation performance.
In this view, economic culture is defined as the values and attitudes of a population with
regard to all aspects related to the economic system; consequently, it is strongly influ-
enced by historical experience. The outcome of this historical process is a country-specific
consensus on price stability, which is reflected in inflation rates. The paper finds that the
central bank independence in a country is strongly related to such public attitudes towards
inflation, which is a result of a historical feedback process. The findings challenge the or-
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thodox economic view that central bank independence as such creates monetary stability.
The problem is that both explanations – either institutions or preferences shape inflation
performance – are characterised by observational equivalence. In a similar vein, Scheve
(2004) detects a substantial cross-country heterogeneity in inflation aversion revealed in
surveys, which also points to differences in stability cultures between countries.
Overall, the literature points to the importance of a country’s stability culture for fiscal
or monetary outcomes. This stability culture has both a time-variant and a long-term
dimension, which also has important implications for the financial market assessment
of sovereign bond issuers. Imagine a government comes into power which is regarded
as fiscally irresponsible or too weak to undertake necessary reforms: A rational investor
should then lose the trust in the countries’ future budgetary situation and, hence, demand
a higher compensation for the increased default risk of sovereign debt. The same holds
true for countries which are generally considered to have a lack of ‘stability culture’.
Investors should always demand a higher compensation from them, even if the budgetary
position at that point of time does not differ significantly from other countries. These
considerations set the path for our empirical investigations in the following section.
3 The baseline
In a first step, we provide a baseline estimation without an explicit modeling of fiscal
preferences. For that purpose, we augment the existing analyses of the sovereign debt
market in the Euro area before the start of the financial crisis. Of particular relevance for
our work is the most recent paper by Iara and Wolff (2011) who study the effect of fiscal
rules in panel of Euro area countries. We complement their approach by adding a number
of non-Euro members4 and by extending the sample period by the years prior to the start
of the monetary union, in some cases back to 1993. As dependent variable, we use the 10-
year spot rate yield differential to Germany. To account for exchange rate risk, we follow
Favero et al. (1997) and correct the spreads by subtracting the spread of fixed interest
rate swaps denominated in the different currencies. Our estimation model is motivated
by the broad literature on the determinants of risk premia of bonds in the EMU; notably,
4Our database includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Slovak Republic, Spain, the Czech Republic and the United
Kingdom.
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the following influences are discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Manganelli and Wolswijk,
2009): (i) budgetary position, (ii) general risk aversion, (iii) liquidity.
We restrict our analysis to the ‘quiet times’ at the European bond markets before the
evolving debt crisis was reflected in exploding spreads and therefore do not extend the
sample beyond 2008. The reason for this is that the recent literature identifies a major
structural break in the determinants of yield spreads around that time. Since then, the
quantitative impact of the countries’ fiscal situation on risk premia intensified (e.g., von
Hagen et al., 2011), some countries’ spreads disconnected from the underlying fundamen-
tals due to self-fulfilling market sentiments (De Grauwe and Ji, forthcoming), contagion
effects between countries emerged (Mink and de Haan, forthcoming) and systemic risk
stemming from the risk of a break up of the Euro zone was priced in bond yields (Di
Cesare et al., 2012). Empirical analyses which apply time-varying coefficient models (Aß-
mann and Boysen-Hogrefe, 2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012) suggest that the autumn
of 2008 can be considered as a break date, which falls together with the Lehman collapse
and the announcement of baking rescue packages in the euro area in October (Ejsing and
Lemke, 2011); as a consequence, the maximum spread in the euro area reached for the
first time a value of more than 100 basis points. Consequently, we adopt October 2008 as
the end point of our sample.
Our baseline specification is as follows:
BondSpreadi,t = β1Debti,t + β2Deficiti,t + β3Liquidityi,t + β4RiskAversiont
+ β5EMUi,t + β6FRIi,t + β7Interactioni,t + γi + λt + i,t
The bond spread as well as the debt and deficit (both in percentage of GDP) are measured
relative to Germany (the descriptive statistics can be found in table 3 in the appendix).
Following Hallerberg and Wolff (2008), we measure a country’s bond market liquidity as
the share of the country’s debt in total EU debt. Fiscal data are annual and originate from
the Ameco database. Our measure of general risk aversion is the yield difference between
US corporate bonds (rating Baa) and US treasuries (again as usual in the literature:
Bernoth et al., 2004; Codogno et al., 2003). Financial market data are monthly and
originate from Datastream. Moreover, we include an EMU dummy in order to account
for possible effects of the monetary union. We add year dummies (λt) in order to capture
time-specific influences. Finally, γi represents country fixed effects and i,t the error term.
8
The strength of fiscal rules is measured by the European Commission’s (2006) Fiscal
Rule Index (FRI ). This index combines quantitative and qualitative characteristics of a
country’s existing fiscal rules and measures their strength by the following criteria: legal
framework, nature of the bodies in charge of monitoring and enforcement, enforcement
mechanisms and media visibility.
We add several modifications to the baseline model which further shed light on the
effects of fiscal rules on risk premia. First, in addition to the direct impact of fiscal rules on
the level of bond spreads, we also study their interaction with the debt level and the public
deficit. This can help to answer the question whether the existence of fiscal rules can –
at least partially – counteract the loss of confidence which results from a deterioration
of national budgetary figures. Second, in a further disclosure, we split the FRI in the
types of rule (i.e. budget balance rules, debt rules, expenditure rules and revenue rules).
This breakdown is possible based on the detailed information of each rule, including an
assessment of its strength, which is provided by the European Commission’s ‘Database
on numerical fiscal rules’ (European Commission, 2006).
Moreover, in addition to fixed effects estimations – which are applied in Iara and
Wolff (2011) and are for good reasons standard in the literature – we complement our
analysis with the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator. This method
was developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007) in order to estimate time-invariant and
rarely changing variables in panel data models with unit effects.5 In contrast to fixed
effects estimations, it does not only make use of the time variation of a given variable
within a country, but also considers the variation of the variable between the countries.
Technically, the estimation of the FEVD estimator takes the following three steps: (i) A
fixed effects model is estimated; (ii) the unit effects are regressed on the time-invariant
variables; (iii) the first stage is re-estimated including the error term of the second stage.
Since for many countries the fiscal rule index does not fluctuate much or sometimes
not at all (Greece, e.g., has no fiscal rule at any point of time, so that these observations
are practically dropped in the FE estimations), this estimation method seems to be very
5Note that the FEVD estimator was criticised on theoretical grounds by Breusch et al. (2011) and
Greene (2011), which led to an extensive discussion which is documented in a symposium published
in Political Analysis 19(2). From this it can be concluded that Plümper and Troeger (2007) seem to
have overplayed the advantages of the FEVD compared to competing estimators such as random effects
and Hausman-Taylor, whereby it is demonstrated that FEVD is a special case of the Hausman-Taylor
IV approach. Nevertheless, Plümper and Troeger (2011) demonstrate that FEVD has favourable finite
sample properties over the competing approaches.
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suitable for the data at hand (Krogstrup and Wälti, 2008), use the same approach for
their analysis the budgetary impact of fiscal rules in Swiss cantons). It dramatically in-
creases the efficiency of the estimates. Yet, a potential correlation between an unobserved
fixed effect and the rarely changing fiscal rule variable would mean that estimates with
the FEVD estimator are biased, even though Plümper and Troeger, 2007; Plümper and
Troeger, 2011 demonstrate that the fixed effect vector decomposition estimator is the least
biased estimator when time-variant and time-invariant variables are correlated with the
unit effects (compared to competing methods, such as random effects or Hausman-Taylor
estimators). We are fully aware of this trade-off between bias and inefficiency and will
back to it in the discussion of our results.
Table 1 presents the results for our baseline estimates, using both the fixed effects
(a) and the FEVD (b) estimator. Models (1a) and (1b) are the starting point and do
not yet include the FRI; (2a) and (2b) include the FRI; the further specifications (3a-5a,
3b-5b) also include interactions of the FRI with the deficit, the debt and the risk aversion,
respectively.
With respect to the standard control variables, the following findings emerge: The
impact of debt (relative to Germany) has the expected consistent positive only in the
FEVD estimations; yet, it remains insignificant.6 The deficit (relative to Germany) is
significant in several cases and always pushes up yield spreads. While liquidity (at least for
our rough indicator) remains insignificant throughout all specifications, the risk aversion
indicator proves to be of large importance: Across all specifications, it is highly significant
and sizeable. An increase of the US corporate-sovereign yield spread by 100 basis points
pushes up sovereign risk premia in Europe by 7 to 9 basis points. Ceteris paribus, EMU
countries tend to have significantly higher risk premia with the FEVD estimator. This is
in line with the view that the euro accession implies the loss of national control over the
domestic currency, closes the inflationary exit from high public debt and, hence, increases
the risk of default.7
Including our key variable of interest, the FRI, leads to differing results depending
on the choice of the estimator. The strength of fiscal rules is only marginally different
6We use the 4.0 beta version of the FEVD; in this version, a defect in previous versions of the Stata
code is corrected which calculated standard errors which were too small as discussed by Greene (2011).
7Note that any exchange rate risks which are associated with inflation risks are disregarded through
the correction of interest rate spreads by the swap spreads.
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from zero in the fixed effects estimation (2a). With the FEVD approach, however, it
is quite sizeable, negative and reaches a five percent level of significance. This finding
suggests that an increase of the fiscal rule index from its lowest level (Greece) to its
highest level (UK) reduces the bond spread by 17.9 basis points. The insignificance of the
FRI in the FE estimation does not come as a surprise given that the FRI does not have
a large time variation. Consequently, this hampers the identification with fixed country
effects. In other words, this finding implies that countries which introduced a fiscal rule
were on average not rewarded by the financial markets in the form of lower risk premia.
The significant coefficient of FRI in the FEVD estimation (2b), however, tells a different
story. This effect is obviously largely due to the variation of the index between countries.
Such a between-effect is completely absorbed when fixed effects are included in the FE
estimation. The FEVD results suggest that countries with fiscal rules in place pay lower
risk premia than countries without such rules.
Before turning to the impact of our stability proxies (and in how far they can help
to explain this discrepancy), we have to look at the further specifications of the baseline
model. Including the interactions between the FRI and the fiscal variable points to the
importance of stringent fiscal rules: For countries with high deficits or debt levels, strin-
gent fiscal rules are able to limit yield increases, but they may be of lower relevance for
countries with relatively good fiscal data. This finding is quantitatively very similar for
both estimation approaches. This implies a type of conditional importance of fiscal rules
for countries with a deterioration of their budgetary position. The FRI-risk aversion does
not show a significant effect.
Table 4 in the appendix reports the FEVD results for the FRI sub-indicators, which
refer to the type of rule. Mainly the budgetary balance rules and the debt rules seem
to contribute to the overall significant effect in the FEVD estimations. In particular,
the budgetary balance rule has a dampening effect on risk premia, which is statistically
significant when tested individually.
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4 Consideration of stability culture proxies
4.1 Proxies of stability culture
A superficial reading of the above FEVD results would predict a strong direct effect of
fiscal rules on risk premia. This conclusion, however, is premature as long as differences in
stability preferences are ignored in the analysis. As argued at the outset, these differences
can be a strong source of heterogeneity between countries, which could lead to a bias in the
estimations. Especially the apparent discrepancy between the FE and FEVD results calls
for a careful discussion of this issue. Obviously, the FE estimations suffer from a serious
lack of variation in the FRI variable leading to inefficient estimations, whereas it is quite
obvious that the FEVD might be biased due to an omitted variable bias. The variable
which might simultaneously affect both the existence of rules and expectations of financial
markets is the fiscal preference of citizens and politicians. Therefore, it is desirable to
augment the benchmark model by the inclusion of proxies for stability-oriented fiscal
preferences.
Any such attempt is, however, confronted with a scarcity of direct fiscal preference
indicators. An ideal indicator would measure voters’ (and governments’) aversion against
public debt in a consistent way across countries and over time. The problem is that this
specific preference relation has never been included in one of the leading cross-country
surveys. There are conceptually convincing ways to derive such indicators, e.g. from
referendum data. Yet, this approach is only available in very specific circumstances, such
as for the Swiss cantons (see above section 2.2), and is no option to derive comparative
European data. In the following, we then experiment with three different types of proxies:
(i) the historically revealed stability culture, (ii) political preferences of the government
as well as government stability and (iii) social capital in a country.
4.1.1 Revealed stability preferences: past inflation rates
The first type of proxy is based on the idea of revealed preferences. Past macroeconomic
performance indicators may allow some conclusions with regard to a country’s preferences
and institutions related to economic stability. Of course, these indicators must not directly
be based on fiscal performance because fiscal rules may co-determine fiscal outcomes so
13
that both factors are too closely linked for any identification purpose. One alternative is to
base revealed stability preference on past inflation performance. This is legitimate if both
fiscal and monetary stability are the outcome of one common underlying preference for
stability. Under this assumption, we can measure a country’s debt aversion through past
inflation rates. The advantage over fiscal performance indicators is that past monetary
performance is not influenced directly by fiscal rules we have to include in our empirical
testing. This approach is also motivated by the literature mentioned above, which mainly
focused on inflation as an indicator of economic stability. As the introduction of the euro
did away with any monetary sovereignty of eurozone member countries, historical inflation
rates from a time not yet influenced by expectations regarding a common currency should
be used. Hence, we employ average inflation rates of the period from 1980 to 1990.
A first plausibility check whether historical inflation rates behave as general stability
preference proxies is to look for a link between them and the existence of fiscal rules. In
Figure 1, we plot the average level of the fiscal rule index between 2000 and 2008 against
the historical inflation rates (between 1980 and 1990) of the European countries. A clear
negative relation can be seen. This indicates that this proxy behaves as expected in theory:
A low average inflation rate signals ambitious stability preferences and is correlated with
the existence of strong fiscal rules.
Figure 1: Correlation of average historical inflation rates (1980-90) and fiscal rule index
14
4.1.2 Government related ideological and stability indicators
The second strategy to arrive at meaningful stability proxies is to follow the literature
cited above (section 2.2), which derives fiscal preference from information on government
characteristics, such as the predominant ideology. Any such approach, however, should
take account of the criticism that the left to right-wing differentiation as such is not
more than a very crude measure when it comes to single policy areas, which is widely
acknowledged in the political science literature. Thus, this differentiation is not very
informative for a party’s fiscal stability preference.
Therefore, we go beyond the crude left-right distinction and use more detailed data
on the preferences of parties concerning the size of the public sector, which are based on
the data provided by Benoit and Laver (2006). This data set is derived from a large scale
expert survey and covers all major parties in Europe. One sub-indicator also classifies
parties according to their fiscal preferences. This measure is defined as the trade-off
between lower taxes and higher public spending. Parties are assessed based on the question
to which extent they either opt for a low tax/low public spending or a high tax/high public
spending approach. Note that our expectations concerning the direction of this variable’s
impact on risk premia are ambiguous as discussed by Imbeau (2004). Since one group
aims at increasing spending whereas the other aims at cutting taxes, both purposes might
contribute to a loss of market confidence in sound public finances.
Based on these partisan fiscal preferences, we can calculate the government’s center
of gravity (seat-weighted positions of the parties represented in the government), which
accounts for the fiscal conservatism of each (coalition) government at a certain point of
time. As an additional advantage, this measure also provides us with useful cross-sectional
variation in the political preferences between countries, which would not be possible with
the use of simple left-right dummies. The Benoit-Laver data explicitly accounts for pref-
erence differences of parties from the same party family between countries. Consider for
instance the British Conservatives, which are in this measure located more ‘pro low taxes’
(16.4) than their German counterpart, the CDU (14.4), whereas the German Liberals
(FDP) even reach a value of 18.7.
A further relevant government characteristic is its stability. Governments with a high
likelihood of failure and low assertiveness might suffer from distrust by the markets. This
15
expectation is derived from the literature on ‘weak governments’ (Roubini and Sachs,
1989). According to this literature, governments without a clear majority find it harder
to balance the budget after an external shock, which contributes to a deterioration of the
budgetary position. To account for this effect, we add a dummy variable which indicates
caretaker and minority governments according to the classification of Woldendorp et al.
(2000).
4.1.3 Population trust and ‘social capital’
A third approach is to infer voters’ fiscal preferences from survey results which are available
on a comparative cross-country basis. Since a direct indicator of citizens’ fiscal prefer-
ences is unavailable, we have to search for indicators for which a link to fiscal preferences
is plausible. Recent micro evidence by Heinemann and Hennighausen (2012) implies that
interpersonal trust is a natural candidate. Their results are based on a representative sur-
vey in Germany and show that trusting citizens show a greater support for consolidation
efforts.
Interpersonal trust is a prominent survey variable which is in the focus of the literature
on ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 1995). In this literature, trust in the reliability and honesty of
other people is regarded as crucial for overcoming all kinds of social coordination failures.
A general idea is that a high degree of trust simplifies economic transactions, pro-social
behavior and the provision of public goods. For example, it has been shown that trust has
a strong positive impact on the functioning of institutions and it is a major determinant of
the quality of government (Knack, 2002). Furthermore, it is already shown that trusting
citizens are more ready to accept structural reforms (Heinemann and Tanz, 2008), less
likely to move activities into the informal sector (D’Hernoncourt and Méon, 2012) or to
evade taxes (Feld and Frey, 2002), and that trust fosters investment and growth (Zak and
Knack, 2001). The general explanation is that voters in a society of mutual trust are more
likely to accept compromises and strategies with longer-term horizons since they trust in
the good motives of their fellow citizens and their governments. Unsustainable public debt
can clearly be classified as a phenomenon of a societal coordination failure. In conflicted
and polarised societies, a high level of public debt must be expected (Alesina and Drazen,
1991; Roubini and Sachs, 1989). These considerations point to the usefulness of trust as
a stability preference proxy: Countries with a high degree of mutual trust should rather
16
be able to overcome coordination problems also with respect to public debt. This should
translate into a more trustworthy national fiscal policy from the investors’ perspective.
For our quantification of the trust variable, we follow the social capital literature and
use survey data from the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey. The trust
variable refers to the share of citizens who responded positively to the following question:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to
be very careful when dealing with people?”. The values between the available waves were
interpolated.
4.2 Empirical results
In table 2, we complement our FEVD estimates with our three proxies for stability prefer-
ences. First, we test their effect on the EU countries’ risk premia without the consideration
of the fiscal rule index. Specifications (1) to (3) include each proxy separately and (4)
combines them all in one regression. Overall, the results are in line with our expectations
formulated above.
Both political indicators show a statistically significant effect. A weak government
increases the risk premia by 6 basis points. For the fiscal conservatism indicator, we
were not able to formulate a clear a priori sign prediction. The empirical results point
to a lower credibility of ‘low tax - low spending’ fiscal strategies. A government which is
devoted to lowering taxes and spending reduces financial market confidence to a larger
extent compared to a government devoted to high spending and higher taxes. Apparently,
the former has an even lower credibility of respecting the government budget constraint.
Interestingly, this is in line with the recent finding by Belke and Potrafke (2012) that the
monetary policy of an independent central bank tends to be more conservative (and thus
more stability-oriented) under left-wing governments.
Past monetary stability has the expected positive effect, which is also statistically
significant. Higher historical inflation rates in the pre-EMU era (measured as the natural
logarithm of the average yearly inflation rate between 1980 and 1990) lead to higher risk
premia today. This effect can be quantified as follows: A doubling of the average inflation
rate in the 1980s increases the bond spread by 6.8 basis points.8
8Note again that this effect cannot be due to a country-individual depreciation expectation. We observe
bond spreads either for Eurozone countries or employ spreads adjusted for exchange rate expectations in
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Finally, high trust seems to have the expected positive reputation effect: A high share
of trusting citizens lowers risk premia. The combined inclusion of all stability preference
proxies confirms the high significance of our government related indicators and of past
inflation stability, whereas trust loses significance.
Next, we add the fiscal rule index to the estimates. We have to compare the estimated
coefficients for the fiscal rule index with the specification (2b) in table 1, i.e. the FEVD
estimates of the model without the consideration of indicators for the stability culture.
Recall that the estimated coefficient was -0.057 and significant at the 5% level.
As can be seen in specification (5), the consideration of the political variables deflates
the effect of the fiscal rules variable; however, it stays significant at the 10% level. The
inclusion of trust (6) or the inflation history (7) leads to a halving of the estimated
coefficient of the fiscal rule index and a loss of the significance levels, respectively. Finally,
the inclusion of all proxies for stability culture (specification (8)) leads to a drop of
the estimated coefficient for the fiscal rules level to -0.008. This result is quantitatively
very similar to the estimated coefficient in the fixed effects model (which is -0.006, see
specification (2a) in table 1). These results suggest that the finding of lower risk premia
in countries with stronger fiscal rules can almost entirely be explained by the fact that
mainly countries with a more pronounced stability culture adopted stronger fiscal rules.
Finally, we are interested in whether the estimated effect of the fiscal rule index on
risk premia is conditional on the countries’ different historical stability culture. For this
purpose, we interact the fiscal rule index with our two largely time-invariant proxies of
stability culture: trust and historical inflation rates. As can be seen in specification (9),
the interaction with trust has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
This indicates that the effect of fiscal rules is stronger in countries which show a lower
trust level. This finding is confirmed in specification (10), where we apply the historical
inflation rates as stability proxy. Here, the interaction term’s coefficient is negative,
which again indicates that the link between fiscal rules and financial market confidence is
stronger in countries which have a low-stability history.
In order to demonstrate that these effects are important in quantitative terms, we use
a principal components analysis and extract the first component of our (largely) time-
the case of non-Euro countries. Hence, we are confident that stability preference revealed in past inflation
rates drive the result.
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invariant measures (see Tabellini, 2010, for a similar approach). The interaction of the
generated variable, ‘PC instability’, with the fiscal rules index again reflects that the
impacts of rules is bigger in countries with a low value of the stability proxies (11). We
then plot the estimated marginal effects of the fiscal rules on credit spreads conditional
on the ‘PC instability’ values (see figure 2). As can be seen, in countries with low values
of ‘PC instability’, i.e. countries with a more pronounced stability culture, the effect of
the fiscal rule variable is very close to zero (e.g., for Austria the corresponding value on
the x-axis is on average -0.72, the lowest value can be found for the Netherlands, -1.96).
Yet, for countries with a rather high ‘PC instability’ value, the estimated marginal effects
are highly negative, i.e. fiscal rules reduce the risk spreads. For those countries, the
effects stay below zero the 10% significance level as indicated by the confidence band.
In particular, for countries such as Spain (‘PC instability’: 0.80), Italy (0.82) or Greece
(2.05), the estimated marginal effects are highly negative at p-values below 0.1.
Figure 2: Marginal effects of fiscal rule index on bond spreads (based on specification
(11), table 2)
Dashed lines indicate the upper and lower bound of the 90% confidence interval. AT: Austria, ES: Spain, IT: Italy, GR: Greece.
These findings point to an asymmetry in the impact of fiscal rules between high and
low-stability countries. It appears that countries with a rather low revealed stability pref-
erence or a low trust level are particularly rewarded for strict fiscal rules. This asymmetry
does not come as a surprise since for high stability countries strict fiscal rules do not imply
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a true change from the perspective of financial markets, whereas these rules could change
the picture for low stability countries.
5 Conclusion
Have fiscal rules really had a genuine impact on risk premia in the past, even if they
have been highly correlated with a country’s general stability orientation? And could
new fiscal rules in high debt countries contribute to a build-up of fiscal reputation? Our
results indicate that there may be a negative answer to the former and a positive answer
to the latter question. There appears to be a correlation between strict rules and stability
preferences in the past. Countries with lower risk premia have benefitted both from an
anti-debt consensus in the population and from stricter fiscal rules. Furthermore, our
results indicate that these stability-oriented countries would not have had a significantly
lower financial market reputation if they had not established fiscal rules. Thus, for these
countries strict fiscal rules may be rather interpreted as another indicator which reflects
the underlying fiscal preferences of the voters and their political representatives.
Still, even if this is true, it does not preclude the possibility that the new establishment
of strict rules is relevant for fiscal reputation in countries with a lack of historical stability
orientation. Our results rather reflect the fact that these countries found it difficult to
establish these rules by themselves in ‘normal times’. However, in the course of the crisis
several member states introduced new fiscal rules and after 2013 all member states of
the Euro area will be obliged to have national rules which comply with the guidelines
established in the Fiscal Compact. One could argue that the introduction of these rules
was the result of external pressure: either due to the pressure of the financial markets
(Spain, Italy) or of the European partners, since the ratification of the Fiscal Compact
was a prerequisite to be eligible for future bail-out funding through the newly established
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). An essential result of our interaction analysis is
that fiscal rules nevertheless have the largest potential to restore financial market confi-
dence for countries with particularly poor revealed stability preferences in the past. There
is already some evidence from federal states that even if rules are introduced through ‘ex-
ternal pressure’, one can still expect positive effects from their introduction. These recent
empirical findings demonstrate that sub-national fiscal rules can indeed be effective in in-
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creasing fiscal soundness even when they are not introduced ‘voluntarily’ by a lower level
but imposed by the central government (Grembi et al., 2012, for Italian municipalities;
Foremny, 2011, for European regions). Our results may be regarded as further evidence
along these lines and, hence, cast a cautiously optimistic light at the Fiscal Compact
and its possible contribution to building a better fiscal reputation of European member
countries.
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6 Appendix
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit Frequency Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Bond spread in percentage points monthly 0.14 0.248 -0.62 2.03 Datastream
Debt in % of GDP, in yearly 2.19 28.169 -42.70 88.41 Ameco
relation to Germany
Deficit in % of GDP, in yearly -0.29 3.125 -8.33 8.16 Ameco
relation to Germany
Liquidity in % of EU debt yearly 0.06 0.067 0.00 0.25 Ameco
Risk aversion in percentage points monthly 2.24 0.755 1.29 6.04 Datastream
EMU Dummy variable = 1 yearly 0.48 0.500 0 1 Own calculations
if EMU member
FRI (Fiscal Index yearly 0.37 1.041 -1 2.15 European Commission
rule index) Fiscal Rules Database
Index balanced Index yearly 1.98 2.742 0 7.85 Own calculations
budget rules based on Fiscal
Rules Database
Index debt rules Index yearly 0.74 1.986 0 8.35 Ibid.
Index expenditure Index yearly 1.05 1.845 0 6.53 Ibid.
rules
Index revenue rules Index yearly 0.73 1.963 0 6.53 Ibid.
Weak government Dummy variable= 1 monthly 0.29 0.455 0 1 Own calculations based
if minority or on definitions by
caretaker government Woldendorp et al. (2000)
Government ideo- Index (0: high monthly 11.15 3.256 5.31 16.70 Own calculations based
logy (Taxes vs. spending; 20: on Benoit and Laver
Spending) low taxes) (2006)
Trust Share of respondents monthly 0.38 0.170 0.10 0.76 Integrated EVS/WVS
who trust 1981-2008 Data File,
interpolated between
waves
Inflation history in % of GDP constant 8.45 4.452 2.83 19.56 OECD
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Table 4: FEVD estimations of yield spreads on FRI sub-indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Index balanced -0.022** -0.015
budget rules (-2.249) (-1.231)
Index debt rules -0.025 -0.018
(-1.519) (-0.945)
Index expenditure -0.012 -0.024
rules (-0.782) (-1.377)
Index revenue rules -0.007 0.006
(-0.535) (0.355)
Debt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000
(1.025) (0.922) (0.859) (1.163) (0.289)
Deficit 0.008 0.010* 0.014** 0.009 0.014**
(1.233) (1.726) (2.094) (1.464) (2.077)
Liquidity -0.020 0.140 -0.161 -0.128 0.073
(-0.045) (0.279) (-0.307) (-0.252) (0.150)
Risk aversion 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071***
(5.025) (5.061) (5.030) (4.956) (5.160)
EMU 0.089 0.082 0.146** 0.137** 0.089
(1.539) (1.225) (2.034) (1.978) (1.506)
No. of observations 2,403 2,403 2,403 2,403 2,403
No. of countries 15 15 15 15 15
R2 0.578 0.592 0.590 0.579 0.602
t-statistics in parentheses, ***/**/* represents 1/5/10% level of significance.
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